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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DEAN K. HICKMAN and

:

RICK K. HICKMAN,
Petitioners-Appellants,
v.
TAMARA HOLDEN and
FRED VAN DER VEUR,

Case No. 940109-CA
:
Priority No. 3

Respondents-Appellees.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a
petition
felonies.

for

post-conviction

relief

involving

first

degree

The Utah Supreme Court initially had sole jurisdiction

over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (Supp.
1993).

However, jurisdiction was transferred

to this Court

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (Supp. 1993).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Petitioners filed a petition for post-conviction relief
alleging

ineffective

assistance

of trial counsel.

After an

evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition.

The

issues raised on appeal are:
1.

Is petitioners' claim of ineffectiveness for failure

to pursue a direct appeal moot based upon the fact that petitioners

received appellate review of the denial of their motion to withdraw
their guilty pleas?
2.

Did the district

court correctly determine

that

petitioners failed to demonstrate prejudice?
3,

Was the district court required to determine if

counsel's performance was deficient?
On

appeal

from

the

denial

of

a petition

for post-

conviction relief, the appellate court "survey[s] the record in the
light most favorable to the findings and judgment; and [it] will
not reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the
trial court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be
granted.'"

Bundv

v.

DeLand,

763

P.2d

803,

805

(Utah

1988)

(citations omitted). When the denial includes rulings on questions
of law, the trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 518
S.Ct. 431 (1994);

(Utah), cert, denied, 115

Gerrish v. Barnes, 844 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Utah

1992); Stewart v. State, 830 P.2d 306, 308-09

(Utah App. 1992).

However, the trial court's findings of fact will be disturbed only
if clearly erroneous.

Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518; State v. Tyler,

850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993); Stewart, 830 P.2d at 309.

Claims

of ineffective assistance of counsel present a mixed question of
fact and law.

Parsons, 871 P.2d at 518 (citations omitted).

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes
or rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented are
contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On

January

18,

1985,

petitioners

pled

guilty

to

aggravated robbery, a first degree felony (R. 76-79; Addendum A ) .
The trial court sentenced each petitioner to serve a term of five
years to life at the Utah State Prison (R. 35 & 68; Addenda B & C) .
Brooke Wells represented petitioner Dean Hickman and Manny Garcia
represented petitioner Rick Hickman

(id.) .

On July 6, 1988,

petitioners separately moved to withdraw their guilty pleas (R. 919 & 39-59) . The trial court denied petitioners' motions (R. 36-38
& 71-73).

In August 1988, petitioners appealed, pro se, to the

Utah Supreme Court (State v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670 (Utah 1989); R.
128-131; Addendum D)).

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial

court's ruling (id.).
Petitioners filed a petition for post-conviction relief
on April 10, 1992, claiming that their counsel were ineffective
because:

(1) counsel

coerced

them

into pleading guilty by

threatening them with additional charges and prison time, and by
allowing Detective Don Bell to be present during confidential
discussions; (2) counsel failed to file any discovery motions; (3)
counsel falsified the plea affidavits in that the affidavits
represented that petitioners took personal property

from the

victim; (4) Brooke Wells told petitioner Dean Hickman that she
3

would appear before the Board of Pardons and guaranteed that he
would only spend five years in prison; and (5) counsel refused to
appeal on petitioners' behalf (R. 2-8).
After an evidentiary hearing on July 27 & 28, 1993, the
district court denied the relief requested in the petition (R. 156159; Addendum E) . Andrea C. Alcabes represented petitioners during
the post-conviction evidentiary hearing (id.).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petitioners were originally charged with attempted first
degree murder, aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery, all
first degree felonies, in case no. CR 84-1436 (Hickman, 779 P.2d at
671; R. 128-131; Addendum D) .

Petitioner Rick Hickman was also

charged with a second degree felony burglary and an aggravated
sexual assault, a first degree felony, in case no. 84 FS 2514 (R.
28; Addendum B).

Petitioner Rick Hickman was also charged with a

West Valley City robbery and burglary

(id.).

Petitioner Rick

Hickman also had a federal parole hold placed on him in connection
with a robbery charge (Tr. at 26; R. 200) . Petitioner Dean Hickman
was charged with other felony offenses in a West Valley City case
(R. 62; Addendum C).

Pursuant to plea negotiations, petitioners

pled guilty to aggravated robbery (R. 76-79; Addendum A ) , and all
remaining charges were dismissed.

Additionally, the plea bargain

provided that any charges the State was currently investigating
regarding Dean Hickman would not be brought (R. 62-67; Addendum C) .
Finally, the information with respect to each petitioner was
amended to reflect a deadly weapon other than a firearm in order to
4

avoid a mandatory firearm enhancement (R. 29, R. 61-62; Addenda B
& C) . On or about December 15, 1984, when petitioners appeared for
the preliminary hearing, they met with counsel in a small room in
the circuit court building to discuss the charges against them (R.
157; Addendum E ) .
Petitioners filed separate motions to withdraw their
guilty pleas (R. 9-19, 39-59) . The trial court denied petitioners'
motions and they appealed, claiming that there was no factual basis
for their guilty pleas (Hickman, 779 P.2d at 671; R. 129; Addendum
D).

Additionally, petitioner Dean Hickman claimed that the trial

court failed to ask him whether his plea was free from threats,
promises, and inducements, as required by rule 11, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure (id. at 672). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's rulings finding that there was sufficient factual
basis for petitioners' guilty pleas and that petitioner Dean
Hickman entered his guilty plea "free from threats or promises"

(AdLJ -1
Discovery
In lieu of testifying at the evidentiary hearing, Brooke
Wells,

petitioner

testimony

at

a

Dean

Hickman's

deposition.2

former

attorney,

gave

her

Ms. Wells

testified

that

she

^•Petitioner Rick Hickman did not challenge the voluntariness
of his guilty plea and, therefore, the Utah Supreme Court did not
address it.
2

Ms. Wells had a trial scheduled on the dates of the
evidentiary hearing.
Rather than reschedule the hearing, the
parties agreed to use Ms. Wells' deposition testimony.
Both
5

represented Dean Hickman in 1984 and 1985 concerning the aggravated
robbery charge to which he pled guilty, as well as on other charges
(Depo. at 4; Addendum F) .

Ms. Wells testified that by the date

scheduled for petitioners' preliminary hearing, she had acquired
all discovery materials and, since a plea bargain had been reached,
she felt no need to file for additional discovery

(Depo. at 7;

Addendum F) . Additionally, the district court found that Ms. Wells
advised both petitioners, at least in a conclusory manner, that
there was substantial evidence against them (R. 157; Addendum E ) .
At the evidentiary hearing, Manny Garcia testified that
he represented petitioner Rick Hickman in 1985 concerning numerous
robberies, burglaries, an attempted murder and an aggravated sex
assault (Tr. at 25-26; R. 199-200).

Petitioner Rick Hickman pled

guilty to one count of aggravated robbery in exchange for dismissal
of the other charges (Tr. at 26; R. 200) .

Mr. Garcia testified

that, although he had no specific memory regarding discovery, he
automatically

filed

a

request

for

discovery

along

with

his

appearance of counsel form in every case (Tr. at 28; R. 202). Mr.
Garcia testified that he would most

likely have had discovery

materials by the time of the preliminary hearing (id.; Tr. at 30;
R.

204) .

Additionally,

at the conclusion

of the

evidentiary

hearing, the district court stated that it could not remember a
petitioners were present at the deposition, as was their attorney,
Andrea Alcabes (Deposition ("Depo"); Addendum F ) .
Although the original deposition is unexplainably missing from
the district court's record, it was marked as an exhibit and
offered into evidence at the evidentiary hearing (R. 145, 147, 194196) .
6

district court file involving the Legal Defender's Office where a
request

for discovery

was

not

filed

with

a

formal

written

appearance of counsel because it was LDA's routine practice to-do
so (Tr. of Evid. Ruling at 2; Addendum G) .

The district court

further noted that the criminal charges had not reached the
district court level at the time the plea bargain was reached

(AdJ •
Plea Negotiations
During plea negotiations, Ms. Wells informed petitioner
Dean

Hickman

that

there

were

possibly

other

charges

under

investigation that might be brought unless he accepted the plea
bargain

(Depo. at 5; Addendum F) .

However, Ms. Wells neither

threatened nor coerced petitioner Dean Hickman into pleading guilty
(Depo. at 4-5; Addendum F) .

Ms. Wells advised petitioner Dean

Hickman that it was in his best interest to plead guilty to the one
count of aggravated robbery without a firearm enhancement because
it would minimize the amount of time he would spend in prison, and
because it was the lesser

(in terms of stigma) of three very

serious charges (Depo. at 5, 8; Addendum F).

However, Ms. Wells

never told petitioner Dean Hickman that he would spend a specific
number of years in prison by either accepting or rejecting the plea
agreement because the authority to determine the number of years an
inmate spends in prison rests solely with the Utah Board of Pardons
(Depo. at 5-6, 9; Addendum F ) .
Mr. Garcia testified that he did not coerce petitioner
Rick Hickman into accepting the plea bargain (Tr. at 26; R. 200).
7

Mr.

Garcia

informed

petitioner

Rick

Hickman

that

additional

burglary charges were going to be filed, but did not threaten
petitioner with these additional

charges

(id.).

Mr. Garcia

testified that he did not tell petitioner Rick Hickman a certain
number of years that petitioner would spend in prison (Tr. at 27;
R. 201). Mr. Garcia had no knowledge of how much time petitioner
Rick Hickman would spend in prison except based upon the charge
which carried a sentence of 5-life (id.).
Detective Don Bell
Ms. Wells testified that Detective Don Bell was not
present during any confidential attorney-client discussions (Depo.
at 6; Addendum F).

Detective Bell was present at the courthouse

for the preliminary hearing which petitioners subsequently waived,
but Ms. Wells does not recall Detective Bell ever being present
during confidential discussions with petitioner Dean Hickman (id.).
Mr. Garcia testified that Detective Bell was present
during part of an attorney-client meeting with petitioners at the
circuit court in order to provide more information regarding
discovery, but that Detective Bell was not present during actual
plea negotiations (Tr. at 27-28; R. 201-202) . Mr. Garcia testified
that it would be totally improper for Detective Bell to sit in on
confidential plea discussions (Tr. at 28; R. 202).

8

The district court found that Detective Bell was present
during the latter portion of the meeting at the circuit court
between petitioners and counsel (R. 157; Addendum E). 3
Detective Bell testified that his first contact with
petitioners was in December 1984 at the jail several hours after
they had been arrested (Tr. at 86-88; R. 260-262) . Detective Bell
was accompanied by Detective Jerry Mendez (Tr. at 88, 93; R. 262,
267) . Petitioners did not wish to speak to the detectives, -so the
detectives left (id.) . Detective Bell next saw petitioners at the
preliminary hearing in January 1985 (Tr. at 89; R. 263) . Detective
Bell did not sit in on any plea negotiations between petitioners
and their respective attorneys (id.).
Appearance Before Board of Pardons
Ms. Wells testified that she did tell petitioner Dean
Hickman that she would appear with him before the Board of Pardons
because it is her standard practice to offer that help to her
clients (Depo. at 9; Addendum F) .

However, Ms. Wells did not

receive notice of a Board of Pardons hearing and, therefore, did
not appear (id.).

3

This finding is not in conflict with Ms. Well's testimony.
Ms. Wells testified only that Detective Bell was not present during
actual confidential plea bargain discussions. Therefore, it is
entirely possible for Detective Bell to have been present only to
provide information regarding pending charges, as Mr. Garcia
testified. The district court did not find that Detective Bell was
present during confidential plea bargain discussions.
9

Direct Appeal
Ms. Wells testified that petitioner Dean Hickman did not
ask her to pursue a direct appeal on his behalf
Addendum F).

(Depo. at 9;

Based upon this and the fact that appellate rights

are essentially waived by pleading guilty, Ms. Wells did not file
a direct appeal on petitioner Dean Hickman's behalf (id.).

In June

of 1988, Ms. Wells sent a letter to petitioner Dean Hickman
regarding habeas corpus relief (id.).

The Legal Defender contract

prohibits LDA attorneys from representing clients beyond the first
appeal of right (Depo. at 10; Addendum F) . In her 1988 letter, Ms.
Wells explained this to petitioner and gave him the name of the
firm that had the contract with the prison to handle postconviction matters (id. at Exhibit A; Addendum F ) .
Mr. Garcia testified that he explained the waiver of
appellate rights to petitioner Rick Hickman and that petitioner
signed the plea affidavit indicating such (Tr. at 28-29; R. 202203) .

Mr. Garcia did not recall petitioner Rick Hickman ever

asking him to file a motion to withdraw petitioner's guilty plea
(Tr. at 29; R. 203).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Petitioners claim of ineffectiveness concerning counsel's
failure to pursue a direct appeal is moot because petitioners
received appellate review of the denial of their motions to
withdraw their guilty pleas.

Accordingly, this Court need not

reach the merits of this issue.

10

The district court correctly determined that petitioners
failed

to

establish

Petitioners

failed

that
to

their

counsel

demonstrate

were

that

but

ineffective.
for

counsel's

representation, they would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted upon going to trial. Additionally, petitioners failed to
prove that had counsel filed formal discovery motions, they would
have

discovered

exculpatory

petitioners pled guilty.

information

prior

to

the

Accordingly, petitioners

time

failed to

satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
Finally, petitioners

claim

that

the

district

court

incorrectly refused to reach the merits of their claim that counsel
coerced

them

into pleading

guilty.

This

claim

is part of

petitioners' list of ineffectiveness allegations and, thus, is
covered by the district court's ruling that petitioners failed to
demonstrate prejudice. The district court did not make findings or
conclusions regarding the deficient performance prong because it
was

not

obligated

to,

having

found

a

lack

of

prejudice.

Nevertheless, the record is devoid of any coercion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PETITIONERS' CLAIM REGARDING COUNSEL'S FAILURE
TO PURSUE A DIRECT APPEAL IS MOOT AND,
THEREFORE, SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THIS
COURT
Petitioners claim that their counsel were ineffective for
failing to pursue a direct appeal. Even assuming that petitioners
11

were denied their right to a direct appeal, the appropriate relief
would be to resentence petitioners so that they may pursue a direct
appeal.

See State v. Hallett. 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993);

State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981); Bocrgess v. Morriss,
635 P.2d

39, 43

(Utah 1981).

However, petitioners received

appellate review of their guilty pleas on appeal from the denial of
their motions to withdraw

(Hickman, 779 P.2d 670; R. 128-131;

Addendum D) . Since petitioners have already received direct review
of their guilty pleas (and are currently receiving appellate review
of their ineffectiveness allegations), their claim is moot.

See

Duran v. Morris, 635 P.2d 43, 45 (Utah 1981) (case moot if requested
relief cannot affect the rights of the litigants); Spain v.
Stewart, 639 P.2d

166, 168

rendered

the

moot

if

(Utah 1981)

relief

requested

(postconviction claim
has

been

granted).

Accordingly, this Court should refuse to reach the merits of this
issue.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT
PETITIONERS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PREJUDICE AS
REQUIRED BY STRICKLAND AND HILL
In order to prevail on their claims of ineffective
counsel, petitioners must demonstrate that: (1) specific acts or
omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance; and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the
outcome of the proceeding. State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah
1986) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

To

satisfy the first of the two prongs, petitioner must demonstrate
12

that counsel's "representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

This requires a

showing that counsel made errors so serious that they were not
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
Id.

Accord State v. Templin, 805 P.2d

However,

the court will not

182, 186

second-guess

(Utah 1990).

counsel's

legitimate

strategic choices, regardless of how flawed those choices might
appear in retrospect.
must

therefore

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.

overcome

the

strong presumption

Petitioners

that

counsel's

performance fell "within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance."

Id.

See also State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225

(Utah 1993); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 91 (Utah), cert, denied,
459 U.S. 988 (1982).
In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52

(1985), the United

States Supreme Court clarified the requirements of the prejudice
prong with respect to allegations of ineffective counsel during the
plea

process.

The

Court

held

that

in order

to

satisfy

the

prejudice prong of Strickland, a petitioner "must show that there
is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors, he would
not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial."
Id.

at

59

demonstration

(emphasis

added).

of prejudice

The

purpose

of

from petitioners who

requiring
challenge

a
the

validity of their guilty pleas on the ground of ineffective counsel
is to maintain the "fundamental interest in the finality of guilty
pleas."

IcL at 58.

13

The
petitioners

district
failed

court

to

specifically

demonstrate

that

concluded
absent

that

counsel's

representation, they would not have pled guilty and would have
insisted upon going to trial
Ruling; Addendum G) .
ruled

that

(R. 158; Addendum E; Tr. of Evid.

Accordingly, the district court properly

petitioners

failed

to

demonstrate

prejudice

under

Strickland and Hill.
Petitioners have failed to point to record evidence which
contradicts the district court's conclusion.

Both petitioners did

testify that if they had been aware of the evidence against them
(i.e. the identity of the State's witnesses), they would not have
pled guilty
district

(Tr. at 57, 81; R. 231, 255) .

court

credibility

of

has

the

responsibility

the

witnesses

and

of

Nevertheless, the
ascertaining

apparently

did

not

the
find

petitioners' testimony credible, a determination fully within its
province.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Sprouse v. Jacrer, 806 P.2d 219,

222 (Utah App. 1991) ("We give great deference to the trial court's
findings,

especially when they are based

on an evaluation

of

conflicting live testimony.") (citation omitted).
Petitioners testified only that discovery

information

would have influenced their decisions to plead guilty (Tr. at 57,
81; R. 231, 235) .

Petitioners' claims failed because:

(1) the

district court did not accept their statements as credible, in

14

light of the totality of the circumstances;4 and (2) petitioners
failed to

demonstrate that formal discovery would have produced

any exculpatory information. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516,
526 (Utah), cert, denied, 115 S.Ct. 431 (1994) (to prove prejudice
regarding a claim of ineffectiveness for failure to file a formal
discovery motion, petitioner must show that filing a formal motion
would have yielded exculpatory information); Fernandez v. Cook, 870
P. 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993) ("proof of ineffective assistance of
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable
reality.").
Petitioners have not demonstrated that formal discovery
would have produced any exculpatory information. Petitioners have
asserted only that they would not have pled guilty had they known
who the State's witnesses would have been.
and

voluntarily

represented

entered

their

in the process.

pleas

Petitioners knowingly
and

were

competently

Furthermore, neither petitioner

testified that they would not have pled guilty absent counsel's

4

Given the numerous serious charges petitioners faced that
were dismissed as part of the plea bargain, it is unlikely that
they would have insisted upon going to trial on three (3) first
degree felonies and subjected themselves to other charges that
would have been filed, regardless of counsel's actions or
inactions.
15

other alleged deficiencies.5

Therefore, this Court should affirm

the district court's ruling.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO
DETERMINE WHETHER COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS
DEFICIENT
Petitioners claim that the district court erred by
failing to consider their allegation that counsel coerced them into
pleading guilty.

The district court received testimony regarding

the alleged coercion (because it was part of the laundry list of
ineffectiveness claims), but chose to deny petitioners' requested
relief solely on the lack prejudice, without reaching the deficient
performance issue. The district court was not required to address
the deficient performance prong of Strickland since it found no
prejudice.

See State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986)

(reviewing court "need not determine whether counsel's performance
was deficient if defendant fails to satisfy his burden of showing
that he suffered unfair prejudice as a result of the alleged
deficiencies.").
Despite the foregoing, both counsel testified that they
neither threatened nor coerced petitioners into pleading guilty.
Petitioners each signed a plea affidavit and participated in a rule
5

In their brief, petitioners claim that they would not have
pled guilty absent counsel allowing Detective Bell to attend
confidential plea discussions. However, there is no testimony from
petitioners that supports this claim. Petitioners testified that
they would not have pled guilty only in response to Ms. Alcabes'
question regarding knowledge of discovery information (Tr. at 57 &
81; R. 231 & 255).
16

11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, colloquy with the trial court
(Addenda B & C) .
affidavits
colloquy.
read

and

and

Petitioners claim they never read the plea

were

coached

by

counsel

throughout

the

plea

However, petitioners told the trial court that they had
understood

their

respective

plea

affidavits

and

petitioners signed their plea affidavits in open court (R. 30-31,
66-67; Addenda B & C) . The plea colloquy is devoid of any coaching
by either defense counsel, and the trial court specifically- found
that

petitioners' pleas were voluntarily

Addenda

B

&

C) .

Additionally,

the

entered

Utah

(R. 34, 68;

Supreme

Court

has

previously ruled that petitioner Dean Hickman's guilty plea was
free from threats or promises (Hickman, 779 P.2d at 672; R. 130;
Addendum D) .

Petitioners' allegations of coercion are simply

unsupported by the record and, thus, their requested relief should
be denied.
CONCLUSION
Based

upon

the

foregoing,

respondents

respectfully

request that this Court affirm the district court's denial of the
petition for post-conviction relief.
ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
In accordance with this Court's procedure concerning oral
argument and the issuance of opinions, effective January 1, 1995,
Respondents-Appellees do not request oral argument.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of February, 1995

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ANGELA K MICKLOS
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES was mailed, postage prepaid, this
day of February, 1995 to:

James L. Warlaumont
APPEL Sc MATTSSON
Attorneys for petitioners
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Plea Affidavits

F I K D IN CLERK'S 0F.:

In the District Court of the Third Judicial Distract Lako County u;<
State of Utah
JAM 10 1235
THE STATE OF UTAH.

>

,j

„. /I

>tM) Vaiu
\

Plaintiff

H 0l ;

/

- ' '=n H/ttisy. C:$ 3ri C/t.

,

Affidavit of

H-;C///;IMA)

,

j Defendant

^.-...K,-

If

fawM

r

^.(c

i fan •"

/
oath, hereby acknowledge that I have entered a plea of

(Name of Crime)

E1

Z""^7/4Y^WX/i/

/ / ) 7f / -)r/ /vJfl-/ / \ /
'1/J tdrtStSSibAJ

fr*tA

* Z . 0/V ////

TOt>KL

^ M d ) f ,<^qW•

Q/= Miur>7Hr* totTHujur (taL&fjJT

Bf

US<r ,

I have received a copy of-jhe charge (Information) and understand the crime I am pleading guilty to is a
(Degreee of Felony or Class of^Njjsdemeanor)
ofNlisdemcanor)
ime ma
mav be
and understand the punishment for this crime
prison term..

g
fine,

T

v

^

^

^^
T

b

U P e .

_ fine, orfcfarfi.
trciHi. Lam not on drug! oralcoho
oralcohol.

My plea of guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented by Attorney fc^fr
V H ^ (<-*z><3X^
^^><^X^m

—
\ c \
—x ~H

who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them.
1. 1 know that I have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury trial upon the charge to which I
have entered a plea of guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire.
2. 1 know that if 1 wish to have a trial. 1 have a right to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in my
presence and before the Judge and jury with the right to hz^t those witnesses cross examined by my attorney. I also
know that 1 have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testify in court upon my behalf and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if! choose not to do so, the jury will be told that this may not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the crime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it be that of guilty or not guilty must be by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. 1 know that under the constitution that 1 have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that i have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testify unless I choose
to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if I were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah for review of the trial
proceedings and that if I could not afford to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. I know and understand that by entering a plea of guilty i am giving up my constitutional rights as set out in the
proceeding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty of the crime to which my plea of guilty is entered.
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another offense of which I havebeeri
convicted or to which 1 have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me.

G007G

&. I Know that the fact that I have entered a plea of guilty docs not mean that the Judge will not impose either a fine
or sentence of imprisonment upon me and no promises have been made to me by anyone as to what the sentence will
be.
9. No promises or threats of any kind have been made to induce me to plead guilty. The following other charges
ing against me, to-wit^
to-wit: (Court case number(s) or count(s)):
pending

will be drsmissecfand warno oTScrcharge(s) will be filed against me for other crimes I may have committed which jfe
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am also aware that any charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made
or sought by either defense counsel or counsel for the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not be approved by
the Judge.
10. ! have^read
this Affidavit,
Affidavit, or
or li have
have had
it read
read to
to me
me by
by my
my attorney,
attorney, and
and II Know
know and understand its contents.!
ive_read this
had it
fh
am
sT*Ls years
*«
'^
and I can read and
_£2lLii
years of
of age,
age, have
have attended
attended school
school through
through the
understand the English language.
Dated this

/

£

dav of

'tids*—Mi

HtSJfirS?Defendant
uetendant

Subscribed and-sworn io before me in Court this

z

day of ..rj*> ^ ^

tmmmmn

tQ

f*^

Judge

Q\j n^&i&JlL
CERTIFICATE OF DEFEI^S^XTTrtJlWEY:

.)

1

,

I certify that I am the attorney for vjStJ{T7V
JLL/jTnt'defendant named above and I know he
has read the Affidavit, or that I have read it to him/and 1 discussed it with him and believe he fully understands the
meaning of its contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief the statements,
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing Affidavit are in all respects accurate and true.

Defense Attorney
CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTINC ATTORNEY:

tktoif/aiH HfUMBfi.

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in its case against,
I have reviewed the Affidavit of the defendant and find that the declarations are true and accurate. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercions to encourage a plea have been offered the defendant. There is reasonable cause to
believe the evidence would support the conviction of the defendant for the plea offered, and that acceptance of the plea
would serve the public interest.

Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendant's plea of
guilty is freely and voluntarily made and it is ordered that defendant's plea of-Guilty** to the charge, set forth in the
Affidavit be accepted and entered.
.
Done in Court this

,

LJ£

^

!

~i _ou •C^it

• --,•.•

day of

'S.J ^AA.*,i.ft.

, !9

*SV.

District Judge
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^fa/t.v

T H E S T A T E O f ; \H A H ,
Plaintiff

Deputy Cter*'

,

Affidavit of Defendant
Criminal

*

».. ^ - / 4 3 C

Defendant

i\Lic< %

iJic/^O

guilty to the charge*
rg*<s) of:

. under oath, hereby acknowledge thai I have entered a plea ol

A

^7)
(Name ot Crime)
Facts

Elements:

LAJkJL
^veaj-cw fry

I have received a cop\ of lhe charge (Inlormationi .Hid understand ihe crime A am plcadim: guiltv ID IS a

*<

or Class of Misdenrea:
(Dcure: ol •emnv
I
and understand the punishment for this crime mav be
prison term.

7

/C\

S?yjZjl~a
POX)

M> plea ot guilty is freely and voluntarily made. I am represented byV

7»

<^vJs

line, o&hoth. I am not on dpugs or alcohol

A,,.„n.rv / VjU-)^y

(^AR-CiA

who has explained my rights to me and 1 understand them.
1. ! know that 1 have a constitutional right to plead not guilty and to have a jury tual upon the charge to which 1
have entered a plea ot guilty, or to a trial by a judge should I desire.
2. I know that if I wish to have a trial ! have a light to see and hear the witnesses against me in open court in m\
presence and before the Judge and iury .vith the right ;o have those witnesses cms* examined ru my attorney. lai»o
know- that I have a right to have my witnesses subpoenaed at state expense to testily in court upon my bchali and
that I could testify on my own behalf, and that if I choose not to do so. the jury wii! be told thai this ma\ not be held
against me.
3. I know that if I were to have a trial that the prosecutor must prove each and every element of the ciime charged
beyond a reasonable doubt, that any verdict rendered by a jury whether it he iham! guilty or not guilty must he by a
complete agreement of all jurors.
4. I know that under the constitution that 1 have a right not to give evidence against myself and that this means that
I cannot be compelled to admit that I have committed any crime and cannot be compelled to testily unless I choose
to do so.
5. I know that under the constitution of Utah that if! were tried and convicted by a jury or by the Judge that I
would have a right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Supreme Court of Utah lor review ol the trial
proceedings and that if I could not allord to pay the costs for such appeal, that those costs would be paid by the
State without cost to me.
6. I know and understand that by entering n plea ol guilty I am giving up my constitutional rights as >et out in the
prccceding paragraphs and that I am admitting I am guilty ol the ctime to which my plea ol guilty is enteied.
7. I also know that if I am on probation, parole, or awaiting sentencing upon another olfenscof which I have been
convicted or to which I have plead guilty, my plea in the present action may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me.

GCpurVS

«»yHJWj^M

.llil » • ! i

• f^ww-tw^vd^^iw^^i^tiwf^r^
• •# ^ c n i f f K c . l i n . p f u . M . m r . u u p o n I M O M J #.., I ' I , , . . , , ^ , •..»<• r*<* « m.»Or i«. n.r *•% *•»%.. i»r « . n . . <*<».»i H.c ».< .,t ,4

%r

-% M l " "

"

*"

he

1 Na promises or threats of any kind have been made tn nduce me to pkM«! guilty 1 he JoUowing mh ;r chat ges^*
pending against me. to-wir (Court case Humberts) or eouMtts))-* 9*~-£* C2*c*s-SSl*J %> <***-$&?^ c * ^ £ ± ^ J 2 ! j f ^ > *

<ix/r

wul he dismissed, and that no oilier? ha rgtfljfl u u l b e fneci against me lor other crimes 1 may have commuted which
are now known to the prosecuting attorney. I am aUo aware that anv charge or sentencing concessions or
recommendations or probation or suspended sentences, including a reduction ot the charges lot sentencing ma»Je
or sought by cithcrdclcnbccitun.se! or counsel lor the State, is not binding on the Judge and may not hcapriovcd 1»';
the Judge.

<^^

10 I have read this Affidavit, or 1 have had it read tome by my attorney, and I know and understand K*. contents J
am
J- *~ years ol age. ha\e attended school thiough 'he
uiuierstand the llnghsh language

If

JLJL-..^V^L-^LL-

~z?~

dav ol

I >e lend ant

'/

Subscribed a^tff wpn£to|KJTore me m C'ouit this.

_ d a \ id

' ^t

<£l±_^.SJULCXLU

. and I can teau

SLMI

.

CERTIFICATE OF DEFENSE ATTORNEY:

¥

a

'WJUJ

.. I I > .

^

g"*

.luillee

,

I certify that I am the attorney lor ^JJ-i (k
Y<£ Hr-Cf-^A*—
# jh c defendant named above ami 1 know he
has read t'*.e AtlidaMi. or that I have read u to htm, and I dtscussed it with htm and believe he lull) mulct ttands the
meaning ot its contents and ismcntalK and physically competent. To the best ot my knowledge and belie! the *UICII.C:MS.
representations and declarations made bv the delendant in the lorc-joine \Ilwla\ 0>*-e-Kj all respects accurate ami tri.e.

Hased upon the facts set forth in the foregoing Affidavit and certification, the Court finds the defendants pica «>i
guilt\ is freeiy and voluntarily made and it ts ordered that defendant's plea of "Guilty" to the charge, set forth m the
Athdavit be jeecpted and entered.
*
Done in Court t.his ^ ^

Ai i inrr
gv«qg

*

-j£<Ml£his$X

Distuct Judge

r -v..~.
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ADDENDUM B
T r a n s c r i p t of Rick Hickman's
Guilty Plea Colloquy

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

s
2
c

o

o

§

P R O C E E D I N G S
JA20JARY 18, 1985

1:30 P.M.

Tli: COURT: State of Utah verses Rick Keith Hickman.
There are two files on this. Are we going to handle then-, both
at the sarre tine?
MR. GARCIA: Manny Garcia with Mr. Hickman, Your
Honor. This also will be the entry of a plea.
THE COURT: All right. Do you want to state what
the plea is going to be?
MR. GARCIA:

Your Honor, it's the same thing as

11

what we just die because there is one additional consideration.

12

This case — M r . Hickman is prepared to plead guilty to Count 3

13

of 84-1436; Counts 1 and 2 are to be dismissed in the exchange

14

for his plea on this case. The other case that you have for

15

arraignment, and I don't have a Circuit Court number, I just

16

have the District Court number —

17

Court, I have an 84 FS 2514 which reflected a burglary,

18

second, and aggravated sexual assault, a first degree. Those

19

cases will be dismissed in their entirety.

I don't have a District

20

THE COURT: For the record CR-85-33 —

21

MR. GARCIA: And there is one other case, Your Honor,

£5

<

22

which I don't have the file here today. That case was supposed

23

to be arraigned in front of Judge Rokich .Monday morning.

24

case there is a robbery and burglary of the West Valley incident

25

reflected in that case. That case will also be dismissed.

§
W

In that

That is

,.CQQ2£

1

also part of this bargain. And the information in this case

2

will be reflected —

3

weapon rather than a fact firearm or facsimile

4

and that can be done either by delineation —

5

is now —

6 I

to be arraigned in front of Judge Rokich.

7

that and enter that. So that is the extent of the agreement

6

frctr. Mr. Hickman as well.

9

it would be amended to reflect deadly
thereof,

and I believe that

I don't have the case numoer of that other case which is
I will certainly get

THE COURT: All right. I need to ask you a few

10

questions, Mr. Hicknan. As I understand it, then, yoj're

11

going to plead to aggravated

12

and as I understand it, that's punishable by a term m

13

I

maximum term m

robbery, a first degree felony,
the —

the Utah State Penitentiary of at least five

14

years, not more than life, plus a fine of $10,000 or both, plus

15 j

you could also be ordered to pay restitution if there is any.

16 I

Any restitution involved in this case, Mr. D'Elia?

17 I

MR. D'ELIA:

I'm not quite sure.

18 I

MR. GARCIA:

I don't think there is.

19

MR. D'ELIA:

There's not.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

MR. GARCIA: Although, well, that's my information

22

that there isn't. I believe that's accurate.

23 I

anything is owing Mr. Kelson at this time.

24

25 |

I don't think

IKE COURT: In any event, then, the maxunur sentence
could be a fine of up to $10,000 and a prison sentence up to life.

Do you understand that's a possible sentence that you could
receive?
MR. IHCKMAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And

although you ray have got sere

advice from your attorney about what you think you'll serve
out there and so forth, none of those things are binding on me
or on the parole; you ray be out there for your whole life.- It's
possible. Do you understand that's a possibility?
MR. KICXMAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And that the fine could be inposed in
addition to that. Do you 'understand that's a possibility, too?
MR. HICKMAN:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: Ckay. New, you were here when I was talking
to Mr. Hickman, your brother, about his constitutional rights? Vfere
you listening at that time?
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And ycu understand you have the same
constitutional rights, trial by jury and all those things?

Do you

understand that?
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And if you enter a plea of guilty, you
waive all those rights, do you understand that?
MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. Now, have you had a chance
to read that affidavit that's there?

>£{)0 30

1

MR. HICKMAN: Yes, I have.

2

THE COURT: And you do read and understand the English —

3I

MR. HI OMAN:

4

THE COURT: And understand what the affidavit says?

5

MR. HICKMAN: Yes.

6

THE COURT: Are you willing to sign it in open court?

7

MR. HICKMAN: Yes.

g

THE COURT: Do you have any questions about it before

9

Yes, I do.

you do?

10

MR. KICXMAN: No.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

I

Before you do that, I want to go

over again the elements of the offense. What they'd have to prove

13

before the jury could find you guilty and have to prove each

14

element beyond a reasonable doubt. They'd have to prove that

15

at 965 South 2200 East in Salt Lake County on or about November 1, 1984

16

you unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in the

T7

possession of A.W. Kelson from his immediate presence against

^8 I

his will using same sort of a deadly weapon. They'd have to

19

prove all those things. They'd have to prove against his will, you

20

did intentionally, you used some sort of a deadly weapon, prove

21

it was in Salt Lake County, prove about the time it was. Each

22 I

one of those things they'd have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt.

23

^° y ° u understand that?

24

MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir.

25

THE ODURT: And then my question is are you pleading

^

C031

1

1
2
2

S
V)

o
<

i

guilty because you are in fact guilty?

2

MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir.

3

IKS CCURT: All right.

4

MR. D'ELIA:

Excuse ire Your Honor.

Before that goes

5

on, his elements I think should be edited on the records as

6

parties to the offense because that would be very importer t

7

in pleading as far as the elements are concerned.

8

IKE ODURT: All right.

9

MR. D'ELIA:

The other thing is I was just making

10

a representation before on the restitution, not being

11

familiar with the specifics cf this case, I do understand there

12

was a shooting involved, and I'm not quite sure what AP&P, whan

13

a person is injured with respect to restitution.

14

there is, I'm just indicating for the record that might come up

15

at a later day.

directly

I'm not saying

16

TEE COURT: All right.

17

MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, there's one thing that I

18

forgot to mention also about the agreements with the state.

19

In exchange for this plea is that there was another pending

20

burglary which the state knew of that they thought Mr. Hickman

21

was involved that they are also not going to file. So other

22

cases they knew of will not be filed.

UJ

23
24

THE ODURT: All right. Mr. Hickman, you're not
under the influence of any drugs or alcohol or anything of that

25

'-CC032

1

nature, are you?

2

MR. HICKMAN: No, sir.

3|

-IKE COURT: Taking any rredication at all?

4

MR. HICKMAN: No.

5

THE COURT: Nothing like that that would affect your

6

judgement in any way, is that true?

7

MR. HICKMAN: Yes.

9

THE COURT: And no one has threatened you in any

9

way to get you to plead guilty?

10

MR. HICKMAN: No.

jj I

THE COURT: No cne has premised you anything other
than the other charges would be dismissed; is that right?

12

13

MR. HICKMAN: Yes, sir."

14 I

THE COURT: All right. Does the State have a Motion
then to dismiss those charges?

15

MR. D'ELIA:

16

Your Honor, the State at this time

^7 I

would again as before, keep the same interdelineaticn; firearrs,

18 J

strike the language.
Also with respect to Count 1 and 2, the State would

19
20

move to formally dismiss those counts. We are aware of the

21

one South Salt Lake case with the aggravated burglary and the

22

sexual assault that's being dismissed.

23

I

24 i
25 I

MR. GARCIA: Right.
MR. D'ELIA: We move for that. And move for the
West Valley case that was waived to be dismissed.

t

.oC0.33

MR. GARCIA: The Circuit —- 34-2367?
MR. D'ELIA:

And with respect to the pending burglary,

also the state is aware of those charges and will not file
charges pursuant to the agreement as well as any other counts
that might arise out of this same criminal episode.
MR. GARCIA:

Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. Then let me ask you, Mr.
Hickman, hew do you plead to the charge of the aggravated robbery,
a first degree felony?
MR. HICKMAN: Guilty.
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead and sign that affidavit.
MR. GARCIA:

Your Honor, I apologize for parts of

this affidavit being scratched out when I myself changed
for facsimile

of a deadly weapon and the affidavit doesn't

reflect the circuit court numbers in there because I don't have
the circuit court numbers. As long as it's understood what
case we are talking about, that shouldn't be any problem.
THE COURT: Based upon my questioning of Mr. Hickman,
I find the plea has been entered freely and voluntarily,
understandingly and doing it of his own free will, understanding
the consequences and I'm signing the affidavit.
Now, Mr.. Hickman, it's ny duty to sentence you at a
time not sooner than two or later than 30 days unless those time
periods are waived by you. What is your pleasure?
MR. GARCIA: Your Honor, Mr. Hickman has no expectation

8

V G034

1

of E presentence report would benefit.him.

2

court he is on parole with the Federal bank robbery charge

3

that he anticipates he's going to be doing some more time at

4

least another three years. At this time he's willing to waive

5

his minimum time and ask sentence be imposed today, realizing

6

the court will have no choice

7

State Prison. He's willing to do that at this point.

8
9
10
11

I
1

but to commit him to the Utah

Your Honor, in light, especially of• the

parole violation and the Federal bank robbery charge, we ask
the maximum five to life.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hickman, then, I'm going

12

to sentence you to confinement in the Utah State Penitentiary for

13

the term not less than five years, more than life and

14

full amount of restitution as determined by the Board of Pardons,

15

and that commitment being commenced forthwith.

16

MR. GARCIA: Thank you.

17

Oh, Your Honor, I also —

18

I

MR. D'ELIA:

I informed the

excuse me —

he also has

some property that was taken when he was arrested.

19

MR. D'ELIA:

No objection to that, Your Honor.

20

MR. GARCIA:

Could we have that order?

21

THE COURT: It will be released.

22

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)

23
24
25
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ADDENDUM C
T r a n s c r i p t of Dean Hickman's
Guilty Plea Colloquy

1

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

2

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH

3

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS, JUDGE PRESIDING

4

* * * * *

5 STATE OF UTAH,

•
•

6

•

Plaintiff,

7 -vs-

CR-84--1436

«

8 DEAN KEITH HICKMAN,
9

•

Defendant.

10
U
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THE COURT:

We'll return, then, to State of Utah

3 jverses Dean Keith Hickman.
4

MS. WELLS:

Your Honor, Brooke Wells appearing on

5 behalf of Mr. Hickman who is present.
6

THE COURT:

All right.

Are you Mr. Dean Keith

7 Hickman?
8

MR. HICKMAN:

9

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Have you had an opportunity to talk

10 I with your attorney, Ms. Wells, before the hearing?
11

I1R. HICKMAN:

12

THE COURT:

Yeah.
And are you ready to enter a plea at

13 this time?
H

MR. HICKMAN:

Yes, sir.

15

THE COURT:

Is there going

16

MS. WELLS:

There will be a plea that we will ask

17 the Court to accept, Your Honor.

—

At this time we are asking

IS the Court to accept Mr. Hickman's plea to Count III of the
19 Information which is presently before it.

That will be a

20 plea of guilty to Count III, which is Aggravated Robbery,
21

a First Degree Felony.

In exchange for Mr. Hickman's plea of

22 guilty, we anticipate that the State will do the following.
23

First, that it will amend the information that is

24 presently before the Court to indicate that the aggravated
25

robbery, which Mr. Hickman is entering a plea to, would have
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1 been committed with a deadly weapon, but will not specify
2 that weapon was a firearm.

My affidavit so indicates at this

3 time.
4

We also anticipate that the State will move to

5 dismiss Counts I and II of the Information before it.

That

6 the State will file no other cases presently known to it.
7 And that another case which was —

preliminary hearing was

8 held at the same time this one was out of Nest Valley City,
9 will be dismissed.

Unfortunately because I was in trial, I

10 don't have that other file number with me.
11 up for arraignment in the District Court.

It has not come
But I think we can

12 be specific enough about it on the affidavit that we know
13 which case it is.
14

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: I can give you the Circuit Court --[

15

MS. WELLS:

16 at least

—

17

MR. D'ELIA:

Perhaps the Circuit Court number would,

Your Honor, on that, our office is in

18 the process of looking

it up, was going to call to give

19 the District Court number.
20

THE COURT:

All right.

21 questions, then, Mr. Hickman.

Let me ask you a few

As I understand it, you're

22 going to plead guilty to the charge of Aggravated Robbery,
23 a First Degree Felony.

If I have it right, that is punishable^

24 by a maximum sentence of a life sentence no less than five,
25 no more than life in the Utah State Penitentiary and a fine is

CCCG2

1 $15,000.
2

MS. WELLS:

Ten thousand dollars.

3.

THE COURT:

Ten thousand dollars or both, the fine

4 and the prison sentence.

And even though they are amending

5 their complaint to delete the language about the firearm, I
6 suppose he could be sentenced
7

KS. WELLS:

—

No, Your Honor, that is the reason for

8 the amendment at this time.

The statute states that'where a

9 firearm is used, that there is a mandatory enhancement which
10 this Court must sentence

the Defendant to.

We are asking the

II Court to accept the State's amendment to avoid that enhancemer)
12 clause, and that's the reason for the amendment.
13

THE COURT:

But isn't the sentence based on whether

14 a firearm is used, not on what the State charges in the
15 Information?
16

MS. WELLS:

I don't believe so.

And that would be

17 based upon proof that may or may not have come out at the
18 preliminary hearing.

But where the State amends that,it would

19 be similar to our being involved in some of the minimum
20 mandatory cases charging sexual offenses.
21

If the State amend§

out the language which requires the minimum mandatory or

22 in this case the enhancement, then the Court, I don't believe
23 has that prerogative .
24

MR. D'ELIA:

Is that your understanding?
Your Honor, that's my understanding,

25 if a firearm is not specifically alleged, Your Honor, over to
a deadly weapon, the enhancement

—
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1

THE COURT: All right.

So you could be sentenced to

2 as much as five in life in the the Utah State Penitentiary,
3 $10,000 fine, plus any restitution, if there's any damage
4 caused.

Do you understand that's a possibility?

5

MR. HICKMAN:

6

THE COURT:

Yes.
And even though whatever your attorney

7 may have told you about, advice she may have given you, or what
8 the County attorneys agreed to recommend, none of those
9 agreements are binding on me, and I might give you the full
10 sentence. Do you understand that's a possibility?
11

MR. HICKMAN:

12

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
And that if I did give you the full

13 sentence, then you decided it wasn't a good idea to plead
14 guilty, it wculd be too late.
15 plea anyway.

You couldn't withdraw your

Do you understand that?

16

MR. HICKMAN:

17

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Okay.

Now, you're not under —

today

18 under the influence of any drugs, alcohol or anything of that
19 nature?
20

MR. HICKMAN:

21

J

THE COURT:

22

I

MR. HICKMAN:

23

I

THE COURT:

24

I in that way?

25

MR. HICKMAN:

No, sir.
Taking any medication of any kind?
No.
Nothing that would affect your judgement

No, not that I know of.
5
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1

THE COURT:

You understand if you plead not guilty,

2 you have a constitutional right to a trial by jury.
3 ibring the jury inhere.
4 |until proven guilty.
5 guilty.

We' would

I'd tell them that you are innocent
You'd be presumed innocent until proven

The State has the burden of proving you are guilty,

i

6
I have to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonably
7
jdoubt.

They'd have —

the jury would have to agree unanimous

8
that you were guilty before you could be found guilty,
9
i

You'd have your attorney with you all through the

10
;trial, question any witnesses that the state produced. You
11 i
jcould bring in witnesses if you wanted to. You could testify
12

i

13 Ion your own behalf if you wanted to.
jrights. Do you understand that?
14 i
15 |

MR. HICKMAN:

16

THE COURT:

You have all those

Yes, sir.

And then by pleading guilty, it's

—

17 you waive all those rights so you are found guilty the same
18 as if the jury found you guilty of Aggravated Robbery.

Do

19 you understand that?
20

MR. HICKMAN:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Let me —

I want you to understand what

22

the elements of the offense are, make sure you know what

23

they'd have to prove.

24
25

They would have to prove that in Salt Lake County
at about 965 South 2200 East, on or about November 1st, 1984,
you unlawfully and intentionally took personal property in
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1 possession of A. W. Kelson or from'his immediate person by
2 threatening with some sort of a deadly weapon.

3 to prove it was in Salt Lake County.

They'd have

They'd have to prove the)

4 date, prove you did it to A. W. Kelson.

All those things-they)

5 have to prove, all the elements that are read.

Do you under-

6 stand that?
7

MR. HICKMAN:

8

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Let me ask you this.

Is the reason

9 that you are pleading guilty of this charge because you are
10 guilty of it?
11

MR. HICKMAN:

n

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
All

right.

What's your level

of

13 education?
14

is

MR. HICKMAN:
•THE COURT:

Twelfth.
And having finished twelfth grade, can

16 you read and understand the English language?
MR. HICKMAN:

17
18

THE COURT:

Yes.

Have you had a chance to read that

19 iaff idavit?
20

MR. HICKMAN:

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HICKMAN:

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. HICKMAN:

25

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
Okay.

And do you understand what it sayls?

Yes.
Are you willing to sign it?
Yes.
And do you have any questions about it
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1 before you do?
2

MR. KICKMAN:

No.

3

THE COURT:

Okay.

4

MS. WELLS:

Your Honor, I would ask that the State

You can go ahead and sign it, thejn

5 make the Motion to amend that count
6

MR. D'ELIA:

7

THE COURT:

8

MR. D'ELIA:

—

Whenever you are ready, Judge.
All right.

Go ahead.

The State would move at this time to

9 amend Count III by crossing out on the third line up where it
10 says a firearm, from that point, firearm, all the way through
11 and substitute a deadly weapon by delineation.
12

THE COURT:

13

MR. D'ELIA:

All right.
And also to dismiss Counts I and II as

14 (pertains to Mr. Hickman, Mr. Dean Hickman as party to the
15 bffense.

And with respect to the other charges, as Ms. Wells

16 represented, we would stipulate that that's the agreement,
17 no other charges in connection with this offense will be filed
18

THE COURT:

The Motion will be granted.

19

Let me ask you Mr. Hickman, after everything we've

20 |said, you still want to plead guilty to this?
21

MR. HICKMAN:

22

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.
And then, let me ask you, how do you

23 blead to the charge of Aggravated Robbery, a First Degree
24 felony, guilty or not guilty?
25

MR. HICKMAN:

Guilty.
8

CC067.
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1
2

THE COURT:

Okay.

You-can go ahead and sign that

MS. WELLS:

He has signed it, Your Honor, in open

affidavit.

I

4 court.

I would also indicate Mr. D'Elia has, and I have also

5 signed the affidavit.
6

THE COURT:

Based on the questions I asked Mr.

7 Hickman, I find it's a plea entered freely and voluntarily,
8 and I'm accepting the plea and signing the affidavit.

It's

9 my duty to sentence you in a time not sooner than two or laterj
10 than 30 days unless those time periods are waived by you.
11 What's your pleasure in that regard?
12

MS. WELLS:

Your Honor, we would waive the minimum

13 and ask the Court to impose sentence today.

The Court may

14 or may not know Mr. Hickman is presently on probation for a
15 felony offense to Judge Banks.

An Order to Show Cause has beeri

16 filed in that matter, and we will be indicating to Judge Banks;
17 that this plea will have been entered.

Based upon that, we

18 feel that there is no real benefit to be gained from asking fqr
19 a pre-sentence report, and we would ask the Court to impose
20 sentence today, understanding that the Court would have no
21 alternative but to impose the statutory period of time.
22

MR. D'ELIA:

That would be the request from the

23 State to impose the maximum sentence.
24

THE COURT:

I'm going to sentence you, Mr. Hickman,

25 to serve a term in the Utah State Penitentiarv of not less

0068
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1 than five years nor longer than life, ro be transported there
2

forewith, I suppose.

3

MS. WELLS: One other matter.

4

At the time both

brothers, Hickman, were arrested, certain pieces of personal

5 property, their clothing, were taken into evidence.

I would

6 ask the Court for an Order releasing that either to them
7

for transportation to the Utah State Prison with them or to

8 a person of their choice since this is personal property,
9 just items of personal property and clothing.
10

I

11

I

12
13 I

MR. D'ELIA: No objection to personal items.
THE COURT: That will be the Order
{Whereupon the proceedings were concluded.)
* **

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E

2 STATE OF UTAH

)

3 COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
4
5

I Susan Sprouse, do hereby certify that I am

6

a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and

7

for the State of Utah;

8
9

That as such Reporter, I attended the hearing of
the foregoing natter and thereat reported in stenotype

10 all of the testimony and proceedings had, and caused said
11 jnotes to be transcribed into typewriting and the foregoing
12 pages constitute a full, true, and correct report of the same
13
14

DATED at Salt Lake County , Utah, this 13th day

I June, 1988

15

17

'8
19

Susan S. Sprouse, CSR/RPR
My Commission Expires:
I November 1992

20
21
22
23
24
25
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[1,2] At first blush, H is difficult to
determine the basis of the district court's
ruling. It might be argued that it treated
the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to rule 66. Utah
R.Ov.P. 66. If it had done so, it might
have found the facte pertaining to the discharge and the policy manual, as set forth
in the depositions, to be without dispute
and determined that under the terms of the
manual, Lowe was properly discharged
However, we conclude that the district
court did not base its ruling on any determination that the relevant facts were undisputed or on any construction of the manual; rather, it appears that the court decided that even if Lowe's factual assertions in
the complaint were correct, they provided
no legal basis for recovery. We are led to
this conclusion because the trial judge never unsealed the depositions taken by the
parties and deposited with the clerk; therefore, he could not have resolved any of the
flatly conflicting assertions in the parties'
memoranda regarding what discovery had
revealed. See Thompson v. Ford Motor
Co., 884 P.2d 109,109 (Utah 1968). Moreover, the policy manual was never introduced into evidence. The court could only
have considered the facts alleged in the
complaint, which had to be taken as true
for purposes of the motion to dismiss and
dismissed the complaint under rule 12(bX6).
We must now determine whether, on the
facts alleged in Lowe's complaint, the law
may provide any relief.
The district court's dismissal of the complaint occurred before our recent decision
of Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd. In that
case, we refused to recognise a variety of
wrongful discharge actions sounding in
tort However, we did recognize that although there is a presumption that employment is terminable at will, that presumption can be rebutted. Berube, 771 R2d at
1044 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.),
1051 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); Caldwell v. Ford, Bacon & Davis
Utah, Inc., 777 P.2d 488, 4&5-4S6 0989).
If the presumption is rebutted, the discharged employee may have a claim for
breach of contract if the employer discharged the employee without complying
with the terms of the agreement under
which the employee worked Berube, 771
P*2d at 1044-46, 1060 (Durham, J., joined
by Stewart, J.), 1052-68 (Zimmerman, J.,
concurring in the result); Caldwell, 777
P.2dat486. Under the factual allegations
of the complaint filed in the present case,

Lowe has stated such a claim for breach of
contract She claims generally that her
discharge was in violation of the terms of a
company manual that prescribed policies
and procedures governing the discharge of
employees. Construing these allegations
in a light most favorable to Lowe, the facts
support a claim for contract damages under Berube. See Berube, 771 P.2d at
1044-46 (Durham, J., joined by Stewart, J.),
1060 (Howe, Assoc. CJ., concurring, joined
by Hall, CJ.), 1052-53 (Zimmerman, J., concurring in the result); Caldwell, 777 P.2d
at 486. Therefore, we vacate the grant of
the motion to dismiss and remand for further proceedings.
HALL, CJ., HOWE, Associate CJ.,
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
( © lOYIIUMIHSYSTlMl

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Rick Keith HICKMAN, Defendant
and Appellant
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
•.

Dean Keith HICKMAN, Defendant
and Appellant
Not. 880806, 880862.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 17, 1989.
Defendants moved to set aside guilty
pleas to charges of aggravated robbery.
The Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Scott Daniels, J., denied the motions. Defendants appealed. The Supreme Court
held that (1) there was factual basis for
plea where defendants entered the victim's
house and shot the victim, though no prop* %
erty was taken, and (2) plea of one defendant would not be set aside on ground he
was not asked by trial court whether he
entered into guilty plea without threats,
promises or inducements, where record taken as a whole showed plea was entered
without threats or promises.
Affirmed.
Stewart, J., concurred in the result
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I. Criminal Law *»1149
aawed-off shotguns and shot one victim at
Supreme Court will uphold the denial dose range when he resisted their demands
by the trial court of motion to withdraw a to empty pockets of personal belongings.
Defendants were later charged with atguilty plea, absent abuse of discretion.
tempted first degree murder, aggravated
1 Criminal Law #»273(4)
burglary and aggravated robbery. In JanThere was factual basis for trial court nary of 1985, defendants pleaded guilty to
to accept the pleas of guilty to aggravated aggravated robbery pursuant to a plea
robbery by defendants who did not take agreement that dismissed the other two
any property from the victim, where the counts as well as unrelated charges. In a
defendants did enter the victim's house consolidated bearing before the trial court,
with a shotgun and shot the victim while
defendants moved to withdraw their guilty •
attempting to commit a robbery. U.C.A.
pleas in July of 1988. The motions were;
1963, 76-6-802.
denied, and defendants appealed separately. This Court again consolidated the two
1 Robbery *»12
Under statute, the entry into the home cases.
of the victim with sawed-off shotguns con[1] We uphold the trial court's denial of
stituted a "substantia] step towards the
a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea absent
commission of the offense" of robbery, and
abuse
of discretion. State v. West, 765
thus an attempted robbery. U.CAJ953,
?2d
891
(Utah 1988); State v. Mildenhall,
J§ 7&4-101, 76-6-502.
747 ?M 422 (Utah 1987).
4. Criminal Law *»U67(5)
Failure to ask defendant if the guilty
[2] Defendants contend that it was erplea was entered free from threats, prom- ror for the trial court to accept their guilty
ises, and inducements was not reversible pleas to aggravated robbery, because no
error where defendant signed an affidavit property was actually taken from the vicstating he had entered the plea free from tims. Consequently, they say, no factual
threats, promises and inducements and the basis existed for the plea. In support of
trial court asked the defendant whether he that claim, defendants point to a separate
had read the affidavit, determining the de- hearing before the same trial judge, where
fendant did voluntarily enter into the their brother Boyd successfully argued
agreement, and witnessed the affidavit that no property was actually taken during
U.CJL1953, { 77-S6-ll(eX4, 6), (f).
the holdup and where the trial court allowed the guilty plea to be withdrawn. Defendants fail to acknowledge that they
Rick Keith Hickman, pro ae.
were armed, whereas their brother was
Dean Keith Hickman, pro se.
not That factual distinction is dispositive
David L. Wilkinson, Sandra L. Sjogren, here.
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellee.
In State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 591, 698
(Utah 1988), the defendant similarly atPER CURIAM:
tacked his conviction of aggravated robDefendants appeal from the denial of bery on the ground that nothing had been
their motions to set aside their guilty pleas taken from the person or immediate presto charges of aggravated robbery, Utah ence of the victim. He argued that that
Code Ann. | 76-6-802 (1978). We affirm taking was an element that had to be
proved in order to establish the offense.
the trial court's rulings.
Defendants are two of three brothers We responded in language that ends the
who were involved in the forced entry of a inquiry on the same issue now before us:
We do not agree. Aggravated robbery is
residence in Salt Lake City in November of
defined in Utah Code Ann. { 76-6-802
1984. According to the probable cause
statement, defendants were armed with
(1978):

* •

-

rm*
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0) A person commits aggravated robbery & in the course of committing
robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife
or a deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(8) For the purposes of this part, an
act shall be deemed to be "in the
course of committing a robbery" if it
occurs in an attempt to commit, during the commission of, or in the immediate flight after the attempt or commission of a robbery.
(Emphasis added.) Our statutory
scheme does not require proof of all
elements necessary to prove a robbery,
specifically, a taking from the "person,
or immediate presence," to eet&blkh
the "in the course of committing a
robbery" requirement of aggravated
robbery. So long as there is an attempt, coupled with the use of a firearm, knife, facsimile thereof, or another deadly weapon, or the accused
causes serious bodily injury, the elements of aggravated robbery are satisfied
[8] Defendants' entry into the home of
the victims with sawed-off shotguns constituted the attempt, since it was a "substantial step towards the commission of the
offense" under Utah Code Ann. ( 76-4-101
(1978). That action also satisfied the element of "in the course of committing a
robbery" under section 76-6*802(1). The
actual shooting satisfied both subsections
(a) and (b) of that same section, thus constituting the elements of aggravated robbery
that provided the factual basis for the convictions.

Defendants also claim that an attempt at
aggravated robbery, defined under section
76-4-102(2), reduces a felony of the first
degree to a felony of the second degree and
that they were therefore improperly sentenced to a first degree felony. We need
not address that issue, inasmuch as defendants were properly convicted of aggravated robbery, as stated above.
[4] Defendant Dean Keith Hickman
also claims that the trial court failed to u\
him, before accepting his plea, whether hi*
plea of guilty was entered free from
threats, promises, and inducements, as required by rule ll(eX4), (6), and (f) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as by
rule 8.6 of the Pules of Practice. He cites
State v. Gibho+*} 740 ?2d 1809 (Utah
1987),1 which places the burden of establishing comph&nce with these requirements
on the trial court Although it is true that
the trial court did not specifically ask Dean
"whether any force or threats or any promises, apart from plea agreement, were used
to obtain the plea,9' Rule of Practice 8.6(B),
that omission was the only one that could
be ascribed to the trial judge. The affidavit signed by Dean did contain the language, and the trial court asked defendant
whether he had read it and then stated that
based on the questions he had asked Dean,
he found that Dean had entered the pies
freely and voluntarily. The trial court then
witnessed the affidavit previously signed
by Dean. The record as a whole thus
affirmatively establishes that Dean entered
his guilty plea free from threats or promises. Warner v. Morris,t 709 P.2d 809
(Utah 1985) (citing North Carolina v. Al
ford, 400 VS. 26, 91 S.Ct 160, 27 LE<L2d
162 (1970); Brady v. United States, W
VS. 742, 90 S.Ct 1468, 26 LJkL2d 747

1. State v. Gibbons hsd not been decided at the
tfonary eyewitness instruction applied* whet
time defendants entered their pleas. This Court
case was tried before State v. Long, 721 T3d 483
has previously stated that when a new rule; of
(Utah 1986), which mandated use, prospectively,
criminal procedure constitutes a clear break
of cautionary instruction whenever eyewitness
with the past, it will not be applied retroacidentification is a central issue).
tively. State v. Norton, 675 ?2d 577 (Utah
1983), cert denied. 466 VS. *42.104 S.CL 1*23,
SO LEd.2d 470 (1984), overruled en ether 2. Although this case, too. was decided after defendants' entries of pleas, it nonetheless applied
grounds, Suae v. Hansen. 734 ?2d 421 (Utah
the standard required by Afford, Brady, end
1986); accord State v. Vasitacopulos, 756 fc2d
Boykin, decided prior to defendants' pleas.
92 (Utah App.1988); eee also State v. Jonas, 725
F.2d 1378 (Utah 1986) (discretionary use of cau-

C01

NEPHI CITY T. HANSEN
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(1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 895 UJS. 288, 1 Waters and Water Courses #»163
89 S.Ct 1709, 28 UE&2d 274 (1969)).
Constitutional prohibition against
The denial of defendants' motions for transfers of municipal water rights is diwithdrawal of guilty pleas is affirmed.
***** against voluntary transfers only,
not against involuntary transfers. U.C.A.
1958 w 1
STEWART, J.t concurs in the m u l t
' " "* CnmL A r t U ' * 6 '
(© tgvyyittsYSTiM,

NEPHI CITY, a municipal corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Dee C HANSEN, State Engineer of the
State of Utah; and Utah State Division
of Wildlife Resources, Defendants and
Appellees.
No. 860614.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 81, 1989.
City sought judicial review of a decision of the state engineer that the city had
forfeited its nonconsumptive water rights
through nonuse. The Fourth District
Court, Juab County, Boyd L. Park, J., upheld the decision. City appealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that (1)
the city forfeited its nonconsumptive water
rights by not using those rights for approximately 80 years, and (2) the constitutional
prohibition against transfer of municipal
water rights is directed against voluntary
transfers, not involuntary transfers and,
thus, a forfeiture of municipal water rights
through nonuse did not violate the Constitution.
Affirmed.
L Waters and Water Courses *»161
City forfeited its nonconsumptive water rights by not using those rights for
approximately 30 years. U.CJL1953,78-14.

Donald J. Eyre, Nephi, for plaintiff and
appellant
R. Paul Van Dam, Michael M. Quealy,
Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellees.
ZIMMERMAN, Justice:
Plaintiff Nephi City appeals from an order denying its motion for summary judgment and granting the motion of defendant
Dee C. Hansen, State Engineer, and defendant Utah State Division of Wildlife Resources for summary judgment The summary judgment upheld the State Engineer's decision rejecting Nephi City's applications to change the points of diversion of
four claimed water rights. The State Engineer rejected the applications on the
grounds that the four water rights in question had been forfeited through nonuse under section 78-1-4 of the Code. Utah Code
Ann. § 73-1-4 (1980) (amended 1987 &
1988). Nephi City claims that a municipal
corporation's water rights cannot constitutionally be forfeited through nonuse under
article XI, section 6 of the Utah Constitution. It contends that to the extent that
section 78-1-4 provides for such a forfeiture, it is unconstitutional. We reject Nephi City's assertions and affirm the district
court
The material facts are not in dispute.
During the first half of this century, Nephi
City acquired four nonconsumptive water
rights on Salt Creek in Juab County. The
beneficial use to which they were to be put
was power generation. Nephi City used
these water rights to generate electricity
until the early 1950s, when a flood on Salt
Creek destroyed the diversion and conveying works. From the flood until the early
1980s, these water rights were not beneficially used by Nephi (Sty.
In 1982, Nephi City proposed to construct a new hydroelectric facility. Pursu-
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JAN GRAHAM (1231)
Attorney General
ANGELA F. MICKLOS (6229)
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondents
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephone: (801) 538-1021
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
DEAN K. HICKMAN,
RICK K. HICKMAN,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
ORDER

Petitioners,
TAMARA HOLDEN,
FRED VAN DER VEUR,

Case No.

Respondents,

920902029 HC

Judge Kenneth Rigtrup

Petitioners' petition for habeas corpus or post-conviction
relief came before the court for an evidentiary hearing July 27 and
28,
were

1993, the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup presiding.
present

and

were

represented

by

Andrea

Petitioners
C.

Alcabes.

Respondents were represented by Angela F. Micklos, Assistant
Attorney General. After hearing testimony, receiving evidence, and
hearing arguments of counsel, the Court, being fully advised, now
enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On

January

18,

1985,

Petitioners

pled

guilty

to

aggravated robbery.

C0156

2.

Petitioner Dean Hickman was represented by Brooke Wells.

Petitioner Rick Hickman was represented by Manny Garcia.
3.

On or about December 15, 1984, petitioners met with their

attorneys in a room in the circuit court building to discuss the
charges against them.
4.

Detective

Don

Bell

of

the

Salt

Lake

City

Police

Department came in at least during the latter portion of the
meeting between petitioners and their attorneys.
5.

Brooke Wells had some discovery materials relating to the

aggravated robbery charges.
6.
with

Ms. Wells neither shared the physical discovery materials

petitioners,

specificity.

nor

discussed

their

content

with

great

However, she did advise petitioners, at least in a

conclusory manner, that there was substantial evidence against
them.
7.

Two of the prosecution's potential witnesses were co-

conspirators .
8.

Petitioners had a pending order to show cause proceeding

pending before Judge Banks.
9.

In 1988, petitioners filed a motion to withdraw their

pleas, which Judge Daniels denied.
10.

The

Utah

Supreme

Court

affirmed

the

denial

of

petitioners' motion.
2
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Even

if

all

of

petitioners'

allegations

regarding

counsels' deficiencies are true, petitioners failed to prove that
absent counsels' errors, they would have insisted upon going to
trial.
2.

Petitioners failed to meet the prejudice prong necessary

to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as stated in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984),

and Hill v.

Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
ORDER
The Court having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:

The petition for habeas corpus or post-

conviction relief is denied.
DATED this

12 —day of 1fff?gSrt7 1993.

Approved as to form:

/s/
ANDREA C. ALCABES
Attorney for petitioners
3
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CERTIPICATE OP MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing unsigned FINDINGS OP PACT, CONCLUSIONS OP LAW AND ORDER
was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ H

day of August, 1993 to:

Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ADDENDUM F
D e p o s i t i o n of Brooke Wells

CERTIFIED COPY
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT POR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * *

DEAN K. HICKMAN,
RICK K. HICKMAN,

Civil No. 920902029
(Judge Kenneth Rigtrup)

Plaintiffs,
Deposition of:

vs.

BROOKE C. WELLS

TAMARA HOLDEN,
FRED VAN DER VEUR,
Defendants.

Deposition of BROOKE C. WELLS, taken at the
instance and request of the Defendants, at the Utah State
Prison Oguirrh 5 facility, Draper, Utah, on Wednesday, June
16,

1993, at 12:08 p.m., before Vicky McDaniel, a Registered

Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the state
of Utah, Utah License No. 285.
* * *

; DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

Associated Professional Reporters
10 West Broadway / Suite 800 / Salt lAke City, Utah 84101

L—

2

A P P E A R A N C E S
For the Plaintiffs:

Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq.
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN
& QUIGLEY
136 S. Main St., Suite 910
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

For the Defendants:

Angela F.
ASSISTANT
330 South
Salt Lake

Also Present:

Paula Glassett
Dean Hickman
Rick Hickman

Micklos, Esq.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
300 East
City, UT 84111-2525

I N D E X

The Witness

Page

BROOKE C. WELLS
Examination by Ms. M i c k l o s
E X H I B I T S
Number

?age

A (1-13-88 letter to Dean Hickman
from Ms. Wells)
* * *

9

3

PftOCEgp?NGS
PR00KE WEfrLS,
called as a witness at the instance of the
Defendants, having first been duly sworn,
was examined and testified as follows:
EXAMINATIQN
PY fis. WICEI^OS:
MS. MICKLOS:

I suppose since this is just in

lieu of the testimony that would have been taken at the
evidentiary hearing that we will just proceed as we would
had we been at the hearing.
MS. ALCABES: Okay.
MS. MICKLOS:

In other words, Brooke would be my

witness and I would just do some direct examination and you
can cross examine.
MS. ALCABES: Fine.
MS. MICKLOS: And also# just for the record
before we begin, Ifm just going to object to Mr. Rick
Hickman's presence only because Ms. Wells did not represent
Rick Hickman, and so therefore her testimony is really
irrelevant as far as he's concerned.

His claims go to Andy

Garcia1s representation of him and not Ms. Wells9.

So I

realize there*s nothing that can be done about it at this
point.

I just want to make that clear that—
MS. ALCABES: Well, for the record, if you want

1

to address that now, Rick was present on some of the

2

occasions in question and he is a petitioner in this matter,

3

they1re both petitioners—

4

MS. MICKLOS: That's true.

5

MS. ALCABES:

6

—and I think he has the right to

be here present to confront witnesses against him.

7

Q

8

your name.

9

A

Brooke Wells.

10

Q

And what is your occupation?

11

A

Attorney.

12

Q

How long have you been an attorney?

13

A

Sixteen years this—sixteen years in September.

14

Q

Did you represent Dean Hickman in 1984 and '85 on

15
16
17
18

(BY MS. MICKLOS)

So we'll go on.

Please State

an aggravated robbery charge?
A

I represented him on that as well as on another

matter.
Q

Okay.

And there are several claims that

19

Mr. Hickman has made against you.

First of all, Mr. Hickman

20

claims that you coerced him into pleading guilty.

21

true?

Is that

22

A

No.

23

Q

He claims specifically that you threatened him

24

with additional charges if he were not to take the plea.

25

Did you make that statement?

1

I

A

I would have not made such a statement, first of

2

| all because I don't have the authority to bring charges. I

3

I do, however, believe that I advised him that other charges—

4

I that there was a potential for other charges out there.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

And specifically as a part of any plea agreement

7

I the state would agree not to file other charges.

8

1

9

I representation to Mr. Hickman regarding the specific number

10

I of years he might spend in prison as a result of the plea or

11

I as a result of not entering the plea?

12

Q

A

Be further claims that—did you make any

All right.

I would not have told him that he

13

would serve a specific number.

14

that.

15

that option.

There's many reasons*for

First of all, it9s clear that Board of Pardons has
Given the plea bargain that he was offered,

16

I however, Z did advise him to accept the plea to the one

17

I count of aggravated robbery without a firearm enhancement

18

I because that would minimise the amount of time that he would

19

I do to a minimum of five as opposed to a possible minimum of

20

I up to 30 if he were convicted of each of the three counts

21

I against him in that information, each of which carried a

22

I five to life and each of which carried a firearm

23

I enhancement.

24

Q

25

At any time did you ever tell him that if he did

I not accept the plea he would do 13 years?

1

A

No. I would have had no way of knowing how much

2

tine he could have expected to do, because that's within the

3

purview of the Board of Pardons.

4

Q

Mr. Hickman also claims that you allowed

5

Detective Bell to be present during some confidential

6

discussions, attorney-client discussions.

7

A

Is that true?

No, that is not true, and I have insufficient

8

information about what his claim is to be able to answer

9

anything more specifically about it.

I don't know when he's

10

claiming that occurred, where, under what circumstances.

11

don't know.

12

Q

13
14

At any time do you recall having Detective Bell

present when you were speaking with Mr. Hickman?
A

I do not recall that.

Detective Bell was present

15

at the court proceedings the day that—in the preliminary

16

hearing when the waivers were entered.

17

Q

Mr. Hickman also claims that you refused to file

18

discovery motions which he asked you to file.

19

Well, first of all, did he ask you to file any discovery

20

motions?

21

I

A

Is that true?

I have no recollection of being specifically

22

asked to file any discovery motions. Do you want me to

23

elaborate?

24

Q

Sure.

25

A

However, at the time of the preliminary hearing

when the waivers

were entered

and subsequently

at the

time

that the pleas were taken, I Was in possession of all
discovery materials and, because a plea agreement had been
4

struck, felt no necessity to file for additional discovery
materials.
Q

7

Mr. Hickman next claims that you falsified a

plea, his plea affidavit.
bit so you can understand.

Let me expand on that a little
Essentially he's claiming that

a

no property was actually taken from the victim; however, on

10

the plea agreement—excuse me, on the statement of defendant

he 2ists

it,

lists

that the property

la

taken.

la

Affidavit of Defendant.

14
is
16

of an A. W. Kelson was

I will show you—or yo u have a copy already—the

Do you know why it states, the plea affidavit
states that the property was taken?
A

Yes, I do. Mr. Hickman was charged with attempt-

l?

ed criminal homicide, a first degree felony; aggravated

18

kidnapping, a first degree felony; and aggravated robbery, a

19

first degree felony.

20

have been the trigger man or the person who shot Mr. Kelson

22

in the stomach with a 12-qauqe shotgun.

22

He was alleged in the documents to

Those were

I extremely serious charges and were apparently substantiated

23

through the statements of at least two police informants,

24

Mr. Memmott, Troy Memmott and Kay Lynn Neve I believe is the

25

other person's name.

8

1

I

When the offer was made to allow Mr. Hickman to

2

I enter a plea of guilty to aggravated robbery, that seemed

3

J certainly to be in his best interest, particularly when we

4

were able to get a concession from the state that there

5

would be no firearm enhancement, which in fact is the way it

6

was. Aggravated robbery in my legal opinion carried less of

7

a stigma than did aggravated kidnapping and/or attempted

8

criminal homicide.

9

The elements of aggravated robbery are stated

10

over in the elements portion of the affidavit.

11

which support such an allegation—and you have to understand

12

that aggravated robbery is a bit of a hybrid category; it

13

does not require the actual taking of property to

14

substantiate a claim of aggravated robbery.

15

evidence before us, it appeared clear that the aggravated

16

robbery or the taking of property or the attempt to take

17

property from the Kelsons occurred with an intent to

18

actually take the property.

19

The facts

Based upon the

This was clearly the lesser of the three very

20

serious charges against him, and so I stated those facts in

21

terms of what satisfied the aggravated robbery charge, and

22

they agreed to that. And that was explained to Mr. Hickman

23
24
25

I as is evidenced by his signature on the affidavit.
Q

Mr. Hickman next claims that you told him you

would appear before the Board of Pardons and guarantee that

1
2
3

} he would only spend five years

in prison.

Did you ever tell

him that?
A

Ifm certain that I told him that I would appear

4

with him at the Board of Pardons because it is my practice

5

to offer that help to my clients.

6

file and through messages and have no information or

7

recollection of ever being contacted about when a board

8

meeting would be, and therefore I did not appear.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Ifve looked through the

With regard to a guarantee that he would only do
five years, that did not occur%
] to make such guarantees,

I do not have the authority

and would not ever

make that

type

of guarantee.
Q

Mr. Hickmanfs final claim is that you failed to

appeal on his behalf.
A

No. What he—when entering his plea he waives

his right to appeal.
Q

Did he ever ask you to appeal?

So no, I did not pursue an appeal.

Do you recall any response you may have made to
I111 show you what Ifve marked as

18

him regarding an appeal?

19

Defendants Exhibit A, which I would have introduced at the

20

hearing and I probably still will.

Do you recognize that?

21

A

I do.

22

Q

How do you recognize that?

23

A

It'sa letter that I sent to Mr. Hickman in

24

January of 1988 discussing with him what could be provided

25

in terms of habeas corpus relief.

Under the contract with

10

1

the legal defender office we have no authority, in fact are

2

prohibited from representing clients beyond the pendency of

3

right of first appeal. And since there had been a waiver of

4

that right through the plea, I was not in a position to

5

represent him in any habeas matters, and that's what I

6

believe I indicated in that letter of January looks like

7

13th, 1988.

8
9
10

MS. MICKLOS: Well, I believe those are all the
claims that have been outlined in the petition.

I believe

thatfs all I have.

11

THE WITNESS:

12

MS. ALCABES: We donft have any questions.

13
14

Thank you.

(Deposition was concluded at 12:20 p.m.)
* * *
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

)

: ss.
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have read the foregoing
testimony consisting of 8 pages, numbered from 3 to 10,
inclusive, and the same is a true and correct transcription
of said testimony with the exception of the corrections I
have listed below in ink, giving my reasons therefor.
Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Page

Line

Correction
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason
Correction.
Reason

BROOKE C. WELLS

this

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to at
day of
, 19
.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
Residing at:
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C E R T I F I C A T E

1
2

STATE OF UTAH

3

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)

4

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the deposition of Brooke
C. Wells, the witness in the foregoing deposition named, was
taken before me, Vicky McDaniel, a Certified Shorthand
Reporter and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah,
residing in Salt Lake County.

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15

)

That the said witness was by me, before
examination, duly sworn to testify the truth, the whole
truth, and nothing but the truth in said cause.
That the testimony of said witness was reported by
me in Stenotype and thereafter caused by me to be
transcribed into typewriting, and that a full, true, and
correct transcription of said testimony so taken and
transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages numbered
from 3 to 10, inclusive, and said witness deposed and said
as in the foregoing annexed deposition.
I further certify that I am not of kin or
otherwise associated with any of the parties to said cause
of action and that I am not interested in the event thereof.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake
City, Utah, this 16th day of June, 1993.

16
17

idim. fti1

CK^ McBANIEL, CSR, RPR, CM
VICKY
Utah Li</ejise No. 285

18
19

My commission expires:

20

December 19, 1994

21

Notary Pubflo
D079SO.
10079
L.. McN-*
f.
South Jordan. I *
Doc

22
23
24
25
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
333 SOUTH SECOND EAST
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
532-5444
Felony-Misdemeanor Divisions
F. JOHN HILL
Oirector

January 13, 1988

BOARD OF TRUSTEES
ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Chairman

D. GILBERT ATHAY
Ex-OtfidO

LIONEL FRANKEL
JIMI MITSUNAGA
IRENE NIELSEN
RAY GROUSSMAN
STEWART HANSON. Jr.
LON HINDE
JAY LOWE
JOHN O'CONNELL
JOSEPH A. GETER

Mr. Dean Hickman
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Hickman:
I hope you have received the copy of the Affidavit
which was mailed to you last month.
It appears that you are interested in pursuing some
sort of Habeas Corpus relief attacking the sentence you
received as being excessive or illegal. We do not, as a
general rule, order transcripts of sentencing proceedings
since we are not obligated, by contract, to pursue any legal
action on your behalf once a plea has been entered. This is
because you have, as your Affidavit states, given up the
right to pursue any appeal in the Utah state Courts.
Therefore, the remedy available to you is through collateral
attack. We do not handle those matters. Therefore, you
should contact the law firm of McCullough, Jones, Jensen &
Ivins who has a contract with the Utah State Prison to
represent clients similarly situated. They can, if that
Habeas Corpus action is filed, make the proper request of the
court that a transcription be provided.
I'm sorry I will not be able \o help you further.
Sincerely,

BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney at Law

bp

DEFENDANTS!
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SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
333 SOUTH SECOND EAST
SAU LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
532-5444
Felony-Misdemeanor Divisions
F JOHN HILL
Otrector

January 13, 1988

BOARO OF TRUSTEES
ROBERT VAN SCIVER
Chairman
0 . GILBERT ATHAY
E*0ffiCJ0

LIONEL FRANKEL
JIMI MITSUNAGA
IRENE NIELSEN
RAY GROUSSMAN
STEWART HANSON, Jr.
LON HINOE
JAY LOWE
JOHN O'CONNELL
JOSEPH A. GETER

Mr* Dean Hickman
c/o Utah State Prison
P.O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020
Dear Mr. Hickman:
I hope you have received the copy of the Affidavit
which was mailed to you last month.
It appears that you are interested in pursuing some
sort of Habeas Corpus relief attacking the sentence you
received as being excessive or illegal. We do not, as a
general rule, order transcripts of sentencing proceedings
since we are not obligated, by contract, to pursue any legal
action on your behalf once a plea has been entered. This is
because you have, as your Affidavit states, given up the
right to pursue any appeal in the Utah state Courts.
Therefore, the remedy available to you is through collateral
attack. We do not handle those matters. Therefore, you
should contact the law firm of McCullough, Jones, Jensen &
Ivins who has a contract with the Utah State Prison to
represent clients similarly situated. They can, if that
Habeas Corpus action is filed, make the proper request of the
court that a transcription be provided.
I'm sorry I will not be able \o help you further.
Sincerely,

BpOKE C. WELLS
Attorney at Law
bp
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ADDENDUM G
Transcript of Post-Conviction Evidentiary Ruling

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
2

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

3
4

*

DEAN K. HICKMAN,
RICK K. HICKMAN,

5
Plaintiffs,

*

COPY

6
Case No. 920902029

-VB-

7
8

TAMARA HOLDEN,
FRED VAN DER VEUR,
Defendants.

JUDGE KENNETH RIGTRUP

9
10
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th, 1993,

11
12

at 10:00 o'clock a.m., this cause cane on for hearing

13

before the HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP, District Court,

14

without a jury in the Salt Lake County Courthouse,

15

Salt Lake City, Utah.

16
17
18

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiffs:

ANDREA C. ALCABES
Attorney at Law

For the Defendants:

ANGELA F. MICKLOS
Attorney at Law

19
20
21

22
23

CAT by:

CARLTON 6. KAY, CSR, RPR

24
25

1
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1

2

THE COURT:

It's striking to the Court

3

that the Petitioners, according to Dean(s testimony,

4

met for an hour and a half*

5

Court has before it leave a lot to be desired.

€

The positive details the

The Court has no substantial doubt,

7

based upon Mr. Garcia's testimony, that Officer Bell

8

came in at least in the latt^ey pjxt of the meeting

9

that was going on.

And the Court recognizes that the

10

plea negotiations were taking place very early on.

11

don't think I can remember a file that gets to this

12

level of court, where the Legal Defenders' Office is

13

involved and files a formal written appearance, that

14

the discovery request is not in the file.

15

a routine practice of that office.

16

this level at the time they entertained the plea

17

negotiations.

18

I

It is just

They weren't at

The Court has no doubt from all of the

19

evidence that Ms. Wells did have in her possession

20

some discovery materials.

21

Court that at least she, in a conclusory sort of way,

22

advised the Defendants that there was substantial

23

evidence against them.

24

that one of the witnesses against them, or two of the

25

potential witnesses against them, were

There's no doubt to the

It's clear from this evidence

2

1

co-conspirators*

And although that's a substantial

2

basis for attacking credibility at trial, the

3

Defendants had a pending order to show cause

4

proceeding pending before Judge Banks,

5

talking about the potentiality of a habitual criminal

6

charge against them, they had to have at least a one

7

- - a second degree felony conviction, with the

8

potential of being convicted on at least a second

9

degree felony in the case before the Court; and the

For them to be

10

the pending potential of other charges being made

11

against them.

12

The case concerning the voluntariness of

13

the plea agreement was considered before Daniels.

14

was appealed.

15

whether they were intimidated or threatened and

16

coerced to enter the plea which was considered by

17

Judge Daniels and was considered by the Dtah Supreme

18

Court on appeal.

19

raise that, and they failed to do so.

20

It

And, certainly, they knew at that point

They had an obligation to timely

The Court simply is not persuaded from

21

the record before it, given that context, that the

22

errors of counsel -- and the Court does feel that it's

23

clear from the record that the physical discovery

24

materials that Brooke Wells had were not shared.

25

clear to the Court that, other than in a conclusory
3

It's

1

way, she didn't discuss those apparently with great

2

specificity.

3

hearing as to -- assuming the truth of all of the

4

allegations of the defectiveness of representation of

5

counsel or ineffective assistance of counsel, that

6

they would have insisted on going to trial having once

7

been bound over to the District Court.

8
9
10
11

However, there's been no showing in this

And the Court finds and concludes the
second prong of the Hi-li and Stri-cki-an-d cases have not
been net; accordingly, the Petition is denied.
We will be in recess.

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
4

1

RBPO-RTE-R-'-g-C-ERTI^ie-ftTE

2
3

STATE Of UTAH

4

County tff SALT LAKE

)
)
)

ss.

5
6

J, CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, do hereby certify that

7

I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter and a Notary

8

Public in and for the State of Utah?

9

?hat I took down the proceedings aforesaid at

10

the time and place therein named and thereafter

11

reduced the same to print by means of computer-aided

12

transcription (CAT) under my direction and control;

13

% further certify that I have no interest in

14
15
16

the evetft of this action.
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this the 3rd day of
August, 1993.

17
18
19

(Signature)
CARLTON S. WAY, CSR, RPR

20
11
22
23
24
25

